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Abstract: In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying games on multiplex networks that
account for interactions across linked social contexts. However, little is known about how potential cross-
context interference, or spillover, of individual behavioural strategy impact overall cooperation. We consider
three plausible spillover modes, quantifying and comparing their effects on the evolution of cooperation. In
our model, social interactions take place on two network layers: one represents repeated interactions with
close neighbours in a lattice, the other represents one-shot interactions with random individuals across the
same population. Spillover can occur during the social learning process with accidental cross-layer strategy
transfer, or during social interactions with errors in implementation due to contextual interference. Our
analytical results, using extended pair approximation, are in good agreement with extensive simulations.
We find double-edged effects of spillover on cooperation: increasing the intensity of spillover can promote
cooperation provided cooperation is favoured in one layer, but too much spillover is detrimental. We also
discover a bistability phenomenon of cooperation: spillover hinders or promotes cooperation depending on
initial frequencies of cooperation in each layer. Furthermore, comparing strategy combinations that emerge
in each spillover mode provides a good indication of their co-evolutionary dynamics with cooperation. Our
results make testable predictions that inspire future research, and sheds light on human cooperation across
social domains and their interference with one another.
Introduction
The ubiquity of cooperation in human societies and nature is a puzzling phenomenon [1, 2, 3, 4]. At first
glance, cooperation seems unlikely: cooperators incur cost in providing benefits to others, while opportunis-
tic individuals can reap rewards without returning the favour [5]. Nonetheless, cooperation can arise in
structured populations through the mechanism of network reciprocity [6, 7, 8]. This basic observation drove
deeper investigations into reciprocity in structured populations [9, 10, 11, 12].
Real world networks are often interdependent, where a small perturbation to one network can trigger a
chain of events that results in cataclysmic effects on both networks [13]. Taking the importance of such
interconnectedness into account has led to a recent boom in the study of multiplex networks [14, 15]. In the
same vein, evolutionary games on multiplex networks are attracting increasing attention (we refer readers
to [16] for a review).
Various mechanisms have been proposed to associate different evolutionary games taking place on otherwise
disjoint networks. One utility function approach incorporates payoffs accumulated across games on different
networks into each strategic decision [17, 18]. An alternative approach allows strategic behaviour to be
transmitted from one setting to another through peer influence and social learning [19, 20].
In this paper, we draw inspiration from empirical results [21, 22, 23, 24, 25], which suggest that norms and
heuristics cultivated during repeated interactions could “spill over” to affect decision making in one-shot
situations.
In two experiments [21, 24], when subjects first participate in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) [26],
they observed greater cooperation and prosocial behaviour in subsequent one-shot games. A similar increase
in prosocial behaviour follows a repeated public goods game with conditions favourable for cooperation [25].
Relatedly, cooperation levels rose when switching from an IPD with a large continuation probability to one
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with a small continuation probability [22], as well as when switching from playing an IPD with a fixed
partner to playing an IPD in which every iteration was played with a random partner [23].
The hypothesized explanation [21, 27, 28] for these phenomena is that repeated interactions foster cooperative
heuristics or norms in participants which then affected subsequent one-shot games [4, 29]. Although recent
endeavours [27, 30, 31] studied spillover using an evolutionary framework, systematic exploration of spillover
mechanisms through the lens of games on multiplex networks are still lacking.
We fill this gap by modelling spillover as strategy interference between layers on a multiplex network (see
Fig. 1A). Instead of the unstructured populations seen in the experiments, our n individuals participate
in two layers of interactions with population structure that emulate recurring close proximity and distant
one-shot contacts.
We represent recurring close proximity contacts using a square periodic lattice on the bottom layer where
agents play m rounds of the IPD with their neighbours using two possible strategies C or D. Here, C refers
to tit-for-tat (TFT), where individuals cooperates on the first iteration and play the opponent’s previous
strategy for future iterations, and D stands for always defecting (ALLD) during every iteration. While other
strategies are possible, we focus on these two classic strategies [32, 33] for simplicity. If two players play C,
they both receive a payoff of m(b − c). If they both play D, they both receive 0. If one plays C and the
other plays D, the C player gets a payoff of −c while the D player gets b.
On the top layer, the same agents, randomly connected to four different agents during every run, play the
(one-shot) prisoner’s dilemma [34] as a proxy for distant one-shot contacts. Here, agents choose to cooperate
(C) or defect (D). Two cooperators will both receive a payoff of b− c, while two defectors both receives 0.
If one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets a payoff of −c while the defector gets b.
We propose three modes for spillover. In the first, which we call neighbour imitation spillover (NIS) mode
Fig. 1B, individuals on one layer may imitate the strategy of a neighbour on the opposite layer. In the
second, self comparison spillover (SCS) mode Fig. 1C, individuals compare their payoffs between layers and
learn from their experience. Finally, for the third context interference spillover (CIS) mode, illustrated in
Fig. 1D, individuals may make a temporary mistake and use their strategies from another layer. A parameter
p determines the frequency of spillover occurrences in each case, and hence is a proxy for the strength of the
spillover effect.
Through these three modes, we amalgamate key ideas from prior work. NIS and SCS encapsulates the
notion of individuals making a mistake in learning a potentially suboptimal strategy from a different social
setting [19, 20], either through their own experience or by interacting with others. CIS captures the idea
of individuals making implementation mistakes due to confounding two different social settings [27, 30, 31].
We also note that our spillover mechanisms model mistakes occurring between distinct network games, as
opposed to random errors modelled by mechanisms such as weak selection and mutation.
Our main finding is that cooperation depends subtly on the strength p and the initial level of cooperation
on both the layers - a double-edged effect where different combinations encourage or discourage cooperation.
These results expanded upon previous work containing an alternative formulation of NIS [20], which used two
one-shot games to investigate neighbour imitation and found that there is an intermediate optimal frequency
for cooperation in one of the games, in the case of a well-mixed population. We also advance their results
for unstructured populations by using pair approximation [35] to derive analytical solutions that incorporate
population structure, and demonstrate the effectiveness of our solutions with extensive simulations. These
solutions allow us to study both the macroscopic overall cooperation level, as well as microscopic details
regarding strategy combinations.
Finally, we analyse the three spillover modes as they coevolve with cooperation in the presence of mutation.
Our findings suggest that transient implementation mistakes (CIS) outperforms mechanisms under which
individuals might learn and retain suboptimal strategies (NIS, SCS). On the other hand, when we allow
repeated local interactions to play a larger role during spillover conditions become more conducive to co-
operation, making it less punishing to make learning mistakes with long lasting impact. This effect allows
more deliberate mechanisms that promotes cooperation on both layers, like NIS and SCS, to thrive.
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Results
We start our exploration by examining how the strength of the spillover effect impacts cooperation. To
accomplish this, we produced simulation and pair approximation results for a range of parameter combina-
tions. We present these in Fig. 2, with individual plots for each mode (NIS Fig. 2A, SCS Fig. 2B, and CIS
Fig. 2C).
The most striking feature of Fig. 2 is the existence of an optimal value of p which maximizes the average
cooperation level in the multiplex network. Average cooperation initially increases with p, before reaching
the optimal value and subsequently plummeting. This demonstrates a double-edged effect of spillover: a
little spillover between the two social settings allows cooperators on the repeated local interaction layer to
exert their influence on the distant one-shot contact layer and provides a boost to overall cooperation. On
the other hand, a spillover effect that is too strong leads to too much influence by defectors on the distant
one-shot contacts layer, and is deleterious to cooperation. We note that conditions that are overly favourable
or hostile to cooperation will lead to one layer overwhelming the other and consequently a rapid monotonic
rise or decline in cooperation, instead of an intermediate optimal value of p (see Supplementary Figure S1).
Another feature of Fig. 2 is that CIS appears to be more resilient to this double-edge effect than NIS
and SCS as cooperation levels for CIS tend to be higher than the other two. This is due to the fact that
while implementation mistakes occur under CIS, payoff comparison always occurs on the layer on which the
strategies are adopted. Hence, individuals have an easier time learning correct strategies, and implementation
mistakes need not have a prolonged impact. On the other hand, under NIS and SCS, individuals directly
learn and adopt strategies across layers, resulting in mistakes that have larger, long term repercussions on
cooperation.
Next, we examine fine details for several parameter combinations from Fig. 2A-C highlighted with squares.
These microscopic details (Fig. 2D-F) show the proportions of individuals for each possible strategy com-
bination for the top and bottom layer. For simplicity, we let Xab be the proportion of individuals playing
strategy a on the top layer and b on the bottom layer.
Fig. 2D-F demonstrates that for small values of p, there is excellent agreement between simulation and our
pair approximation results at even the microscopic level (detailed equations are presented in the SI). The
most outstanding feature is that context interference spillover mode has much higher Xdc than the other
modes, as seen in Fig. 2F. This happens because, the parameter combinations in Fig. 2 leads to almost all
C on the bottom layer and almost all D on the top layer. As we saw above, in CIS, players learn strategies
more easily compared to NIS and SCS, so individuals can learn the optimal strategy of playing D on the
bottom layer and playing C on the top layer.
On the other hand, SCS (Fig. 2E) stands out as having the highest proportion of individuals who are
cooperators on both layers, with NIS (Fig. 2D) coming in a close second. In both cases, individuals are
adopting spillover strategies that their neighbours or themselves have been successfully using within the
opposite layer. This leads to a higher level of cooperation in the one-shot PD layer due to individuals
learning and retaining the suboptimal strategy of playing C on that layer.
Fig. 3 further illuminates the differences in microscopic details between the three spillover modes for a subset
of the parameter combinations in Fig. 2. Fig. 3A-C shows SCS having the highest Xcc , while Fig. 3D-F
shows CIS having the highest Xdc . We get a clearer view of how NIS differs from the rest, with higher X
d
d
and Xcd (Fig. 3G-L). Fig. S2 and S3 extends Fig. 3 for a range of p from 0 to 0.40.
In our previous results, we have initialised individual strategies C or D on both layers uniformly at random.
But how will spillover behave when the initial probability of being a cooperator varies on each layer? We
address this question by exhaustively exploring the parameter space using pair approximation as illustrated
by Fig. 4 (NIS Fig. 4A, SCS Fig. 4B, CIS Fig. 4C).
Here, we discover a bistability phenomenon. For a fixed frequency of spillover p, the parameter space is
partitioned into two distinct regions. Depending on the initial proportion of cooperators on each network
layer, the spillover effect can either help or hinder cooperation, as shown in more detailed plots by both
simulation and pair approximation (Fig. 4D-I). This bistability phenomenon has potential social policy
implications: if the proportion of cooperators in one setting can be actively raised to a sufficient level,
spillover can promote overall levels of cooperation.
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As shown in Fig. 4, the number of initial cooperators on the bottom layer has a larger impact on whether
spillover hinders or helps cooperation than the number of initial cooperators on the top layer. An example
of this can be seen in Fig. 4A, where at p = 0.3, when the number of initial cooperators on the top layer is
close to zero, sufficient number of initial cooperators on the bottom layer can still result in a spillover effect
that helps cooperation. In contrast, for close to zero initial cooperators on the bottom layer, no amount of
initial cooperators on the top layer will result in a beneficial effect of spillover on cooperation.
So far, we have studied these three spillover modes separately. Next, we will compare them when all three
modes are present and are potentially competing with each other. We initialise each individual with a
spillover mode uniformly at random and allow the modes to coevolve with strategy while at the same time
introducing mutation. Fig. 5 shows our results for various p.
Each bar in Fig. 5A-B indicates the proportion of individuals with each of the three spillover mode. For all of
the choices of p in Fig. 5A, the highest is CIS, followed by SCS and then NIS, with this trend becoming more
prominent as p increases. We explain the dominance of CIS for this parameter combination by the crucial
role of individuals playing D on the top prisoner’s dilemma layer, and C on the bottom iterated prisoner’s
dilemma layer (Fig. 3). When p is small, the top layer is approximately at full defection, while the bottom
layer is approximately at full cooperation. So, playing D on top and C on the bottom offers the highest total
payoff on average. As we saw in Fig.s 2F and 3, CIS shows a relative abundance of individuals with this
type of mixed strategy, providing a convincing explanation for the supremacy of CIS in the competition.
SCS mode produces a relatively high proportion of individuals cooperating on both layers, which might
intuitively be what one would desire in such a social system. However, this tendency results in a loss of
individuals playing the optimal combination of strategies (Xdc ), leading to a loss of competitiveness when
pitted against other spillover modes, under the parameter combination of Fig. 5A. The dominance of CIS
appears to be robust when the cost of cooperation c was lowered to c = 0.30, 0.25 and 0.20 (see Fig. S4).
However, at c = 0.20, this dominance is reduced. Conditions are favourable for cooperation, so we have high
equilibrium proportions of cooperators on both layers (Figure S5A). In this situation, Xcc has a higher payoff
than Xdc and hence, NIS and SCS become more competitive. This increase in competitiveness of the strategy
that cooperates on both layers can be overcome by an increase in p (Figure S4A for p = 0.05). However, this
does not happen when cooperation on both levels are high enough, and CIS once again loses its advantage
(Fig. S4A and S5A, show the value c = 0.20, p = 0.1).
In Fig. 5B, we consider an additional parameter α ∈ (0, 1) which governs the relative influence of the two
layers. When spillover occurs under NIS and SCS, α is the probability that an individual on the top layer is
chosen to possibly learn a strategy from the bottom layer. Under CIS, α is the probability that an individual
uses her bottom layer strategy during spillover. We make these definitions so that parameter α consistently
refers to how strong an influence the bottom IPD layer has when spillover occurs
We find that higher α promotes cooperation in general (Fig. 5C-D) and this could potentially alter the
results of coevolution. As shown in Fig. 5B, it is possible for SCS to be favoured by selection instead of CIS
when we set α = 0.95. This happens because there is a much higher level of cooperation in both layers when
α is high (Fig. 5D and S6B) which allows Xcc to be more competitive than X
d
c . We show comparison of the
cooperation level on both layers over time for both the α = 0.5 and α = 0.95 scenarios described in Fig. S7
and S8.
Discussion
Our results generate testable hypotheses that can inspire future research. Several experiments [21, 22, 23, 24]
in the literature had participants play the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and then switch to various versions
of one-shot games. All of these cases reported that the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, with conditions that
favour cooperation, had a positive effect on cooperation level in the subsequent one-shot game.
Using setups similar to the experiments, one of the spillover mode could be incorporated to test for the
existence of an optimal frequency of spillover p. For instance, NIS could be implemented experimentally by
periodically hiding or revealing the strategies of neighbours on a layer. Similarly, CIS could be implemented
by occasionally hiding or mislabelling the layers. At the same time, this can be used to test if spillover modes
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differ in the proportion of individuals playing each of the four possible top-bottom strategy combinations
(Fig. 3), which offers a novel method for comparing and categorizing the myriad of spillover mechanisms
that are possible.
Finally, our findings regarding the bistability that arise from varying the initial levels of cooperation on each
layer (Fig. 4) could be leveraged to promote cooperation through spillover. As was done in a recent human
behaviour experiment [36], mixing automated bots with human subjects can lead to the desired cooperation
level.
Materials and methods
In our model, n individuals are placed on two network layers. The top layer, T , is a random regular network of
degree four, regenerated with every run, while the bottom layer, B, is a two dimensional lattice with periodic
boundaries. Individuals play a special version of the prisoner’s dilemma game, known as the donation game,
with their neighbours on the top layer: they are initially a cooperator C = [1, 0]T or defector D = [0, 1]T
with equal probability. The payoff matrix MT that we use for prisoner’s dilemma is,
MT =
[
b− c −c
b 0
]
.
where b is the benefit of cooperation, while c is the cost of cooperation. On the bottom layer, individuals
play the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with their partners, where the game is repeated m times. They
initially start with the strategy C or D with equal probability. In this case, C refers to tit-for-tat (TFT),
where the individual cooperates on the first iteration and plays the opponent’s previous strategy for future
iterations. Here, D stands for always defecting (ALLD) during every iteration. The payoff matrix MB for
this is,
MB =
[
m(b− c) −c
b 0
]
.
Let ski ∈ {[1, 0]T , [0, 1]T } be the strategy of individual i on layer k = {T,B}, and Mk be the payoff matrix
of the game on layer k = {T,B}. Then, the total payoff of an individual i on layer k is given by,
P ki =
∑
j∈Nki
(ski )
TMks
k
j ,
where N ki is the neighbourhood of i on layer k.
At each discrete time step, we randomly choose a focal individual. Under NIS and SCS, with probability
1− p, this individual updates her strategy. Otherwise, with probability p, spillover occurs. Under CIS, this
individual always updates her strategy using a modified procedure described below.
Strategy updating. If individual i chooses to update her strategy, the top layer is chosen as the focal layer
with probability 12 . Otherwise, the bottom layer is chosen as the focal layer. Next, one of her neighbour j on
the focal layer is picked at random. Then, the probability that i copies the strategy of j on the focal layer
k is given by the Fermi equation [37, 38],
F (skj → ski ) =
1
1 + e−β(P
k
j −Pki )
,
where parameter β determines the intensity of selection, and P ki , P
k
j are the total payoffs within the layer k,
of the focal individual i and the neighbour j respectively.
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Neighbour Imitation. If spillover occurs under NIS, we choose the top layer to be the focal layer with
probability α. Otherwise, with probability 1− α, we choose the bottom layer. A neighbour on the layer op-
posite to the focal layer is chosen randomly. Then, the focal individual does payoff comparison and strategy
updating on the non-focal layer. However, if she decides to copy this neighbour’s strategy, the strategy is
instead applied to focal layer, as illustrated by Fig. 1B.
Self Comparison. If spillover occurs under SCS, we choose the top layer to be the focal layer with
probability α. Otherwise, with probability 1−α, we choose the bottom layer. The focal individual then does
payoff comparison and strategy updating with herself on the layer opposite to the focal layer, as shown in
Fig. 1C. This means that there is a chance for the individual’s strategy on the focal layer to be replaced with
her strategy on the non-focal layer. However, during SCS, her payoff on the bottom IPD layer is normalized
by dividing the payoff matrix throughout by the number of game iterations. The payoff matrix used for SCS
is,
( C D
C b− c − cm
D bm 0
)
.
Context Interference. Under CIS, individuals always update their strategy. However, the procedure
for doing so is modified. During strategy updating, both the focal individual and the randomly chosen
neighbour independently has a probability p of experiencing context interference. If one of them does, she
has an independent probability α of using her bottom layer strategy for all parts of the strategy updating
procedure. Otherwise, with probability 1 − α, she uses her top layer strategy. These definitions are made
so that parameter α consistently refers to how strong an influence the bottom IPD layer has when spillover
occurs. This modified strategy updating procedure is shown in Fig. 1D.
Coevolution and mutation. Fig. 5 was generated by subjecting the three spillover modes to co-evolution
and mutation. Individuals initially are assigned a spillover mode at random. We then proceed with two
distinct phases: the regular phase and subsequently the coevolution phase. During the regular phase, at each
discrete time step, a focal individual is chosen at random, then according to her spillover mode, strategy
updating or spillover is carried out as described above. During the coevolution phase, a focal individual and
a focal layer are chosen uniformly at random. The focal individual then picks a neighbour on the focal layer
at random. Their total payoffs on the multiplex network is then calculated by summing up their total payoffs
across both layers. Payoff comparison is then done using the Fermi equation, which gives the probability
of the focal individual copying the neighbour’s spillover mode. These two phases are run for 104 time steps
each, and then repeated in the same order (regular then coevolution phase) until the desired total number
of time steps is achieved when summed across all phases.
In both the regular and coevolution phases, whenever strategy update is successful, there is a probability µ
of mutation. When mutation occurs, strategy or spillover mode is selected at random, instead of copied.
Analytical solutions. We derived analytical solutions for each of the spillover mode, taking into account
population structure, using extended pair approximation. We refer readers to the SI for the pair approxi-
mation equations and their details.
Data acessibility
The datasets and code supporting this article have been uploaded as part of the supplementary material.
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Figure 1. Spillover modes in multiplex games. In Fig. 1A, on the bottom layer, individuals play the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma on a square lattice with periodic boundary. On the top layer, they play the one
shot prisoner’s dilemma on a random regular network with degree four. Individuals compare payoffs with
neighbours within the layer, to decide whether to adopt a neighbour’s strategy in that layer. In addition,
there is a probability of using one of the three spillover modes instead, to adopt strategies from another
layer. For Fig. 1B, neighbour imitation mode, the individual compares payoff with neighbours on the same
layer, and applies adopted strategies to the opposite layer. In Fig 1C, self comparison mode, the individual
compares her normalized payoffs on each layer, and decides whether to implement her strategy from one layer
in another. For Fig 1D, context interference mode, the individual is susceptible to temporary interference
from mistaking the context of the interaction, which results in temporarily using strategies from the opposite
layer.
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Figure 2. Double-edged effects of spillover. Fig. 2A-C shows simulation and pair approximation results
for average proportion of cooperators for each spillover mode Fig. 2A neighbour imitation, Fig. 2B self
comparison and Fig. 2C context interference. As shown in more details by Fig. 2D-F, analytical and
simulation results are in good agreement at low frequencies of spillover p. For some parameter combinations,
a double-edge effect of spillover on cooperation reveals itself in the form of an initial increase in cooperation
with p, before a subsequent decline after an optimal p. Fig. 2D-F presents microscopic details of strategy
profile proportions associated with each spillover mode, taken from Fig. 2A-C at parameter combinations
(). Self comparison has the largest proportion of individuals cooperating on both layers (green line), while
context interference produces the largest proportion of individuals cooperating on the bottom layer and
defecting on the top layer (yellow line). Parameters: n = 3600, m = 4, β = 0.2, b = 1, α = 0.5. Simulations:
6×106 time steps, averaged over 100 runs. p has step size 0.01 from p = 0 to 0.4, and step size 0.1 otherwise.
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Figure 3. Microscopic characteristics of spillover modes. Figure compares proportion of individual
top-bottom strategy combinations of each spillover mode for the parameters in Fig. 2, with different scales
on the vertical axes. Each spillover mode differs in their microscopic characteristics. In Fig. 3A-C, self
comparison has the highest proportion of individuals cooperating on both layers, Xcc . In Fig. 3D-F, context
interference has the highest proportion with the payoff maximizing strategy profile Xdc . While in Fig. 3G-L,
neighbour imitation has the largest Xdd and X
c
d proportions. Parameters: n = 3600, m = 4, b = 1, β = 0.2,
α = 0.5. Simulations: 6× 106 time steps, averaged over 100 runs. c is the cost of cooperation.
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Figure 4. Bistability phenomenon. Spillover can hinder or promote cooperation depending on initial
conditions. Fig. 4A-C illustrates, for each frequency of spillover p, the initial level of cooperators that
would result in zero cooperation at equilibrium, under each spillover mode. In all cases, for a fixed p, there
is a threshold level of initial cooperators on each network layer beyond which the spillover effect switches
to working in favor of cooperation. The initial proportion of cooperators required for spillover effect to
give rise to cooperation becomes more demanding as p increases. Context interference is shown to be most
resilient to this, followed by self comparison, while neighbour imitation is the most vulnerable. Fig. 4D-I
demonstrates the bistability phenomenon for selected parameter combinations () with both simulation and
pair approximation. Parameters: n = 3600, m = 4, c = 0.35, b = 1, β = 0.2, α = 0.5. Data for Fig. 4A-C
starts at 0.05 and ends at 0.95 initial cooperators for both layers. Simulations in Fig. 4D-I: 6 × 106 time
steps, averaged over 200 runs.
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Figure 5. Coevolution of spillover modes and cooperation. Fig. 5 shows the proportion of each
spillover mode, for low values of p, when spillover modes coevolve with strategy in the presence of mutation.
Self comparison (red) is second place in Fig. 5A despite having the most individuals who cooperate on
both layers. Context interference (yellow) has the largest proportion due to having the most individuals
playing the payoff maximizing combination of C on the bottom layer and D on the top layer. Neighbour
imitation (blue) accounts for the least proportion of the population. Fig. 5B shows that when α = 0.95, self
comparison spillover mode can have the highest proportion instead. A high α allows repeated interactions
in the bottom layer to have a large influence and creates very favourable conditions for cooperation, as
shown by Fig. 5C-D. This allows for individuals cooperating on both layers, which is plentiful under SCS,
to become competitive during coevolution. Parameters: n = 400, m = 4, c = 0.35, β = 0.2, b = 1. Mutation
rate µ = 10−4, 7.2 × 109 total time steps, combined from at most 7 runs for Fig. 5A and 5C. µ = 10−3,
1.4× 109 total time steps, combined from 6 runs for Fig. 5B and 5D.
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Figure S 1. Cooperation under highly beneficial or detrimental conditions. Figure indicates
that when conditions are highly beneficial or detrimental to cooperation, average cooperation level in the
multiplex network rapidly rise to one or decline to zero monotonically. As illustrated by Fig. 2 in the main
text, an optimal p arise for conditions in between these extremes. Parameters: β = 0.2, b = 1, α = 0.5.
Results generated using pair approximation.
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Figure S 2. Extended Fig. 3 for Xcc and X
d
c . Figure shows an extended version of Fig. 3 in the main
text for the proportion of individuals with strategy profile Xcc and X
d
c respectively, for each spillover mode.
Parameters: n = 3600, b = 1, β = 0.2, α = 0.5. Parameter p range from p = 0 to p = 0.40 in steps of 0.01.
c is the cost of cooperation. Simulations: 6× 106 time steps, averaged over 100 runs.
17
Figure S 3. Extended Fig. 3 for Xdd and X
c
d. Figure shows an extended version of Fig. 3 in the main
text for the proportion of individuals with strategy profile Xdd and X
c
d respectively, for each spillover mode.
Parameters: n = 3600, b = 1, β = 0.2, α = 0.5. Parameter p range from p = 0 to p = 0.40 in steps of 0.01.
c is the cost of cooperation. Simulations: 6× 106 time steps, averaged over 100 runs.
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Figure S 4. Coevolution of spillover modes for c = 0.30, 0.25, 0.20. Proportion of spillover modes
under coevolution and mutation are shown here for parameters different from Fig. 5A in the main text. For
cost of cooperation c = 0.30, p = 0.03, we see that neighbour imitation and self comparison are eventually
matched, but the competitive advantage of self comparison is exaggerated with a higher p = 0.04. At
c = 0.20, when conditions are very favourable for cooperation, context interference starts to lose its lead.
However, if support for cooperation is not strong enough, context interference can still maintain its lead with
a sufficiently high p, as shown by the c = 0.20, p = 0.05 case. Fig. S5 contain more details explaining these
phenomena. Parameters: n = 400, β = 0.2, b = 1, α = 0.5, mutation rate µ = 10−4. Simulation results
consists of at least 4.7× 109 total time steps, combined over 6 runs.
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Figure S 5. Fine details for spillover modes at c = 0.20 and 0.30. Figure shows, for each spillover
mode, the proportion of cooperators qc, pc on each network layer, as well as the strategy profiles X
c
c , X
d
c .
Fig. S5A explains what we see with the c = 0.20 case in Fig. S4A. As p is increased from 0.03 to 0.04, we
see a rise in cooperation in both network layers, leading to an increase in the competitiveness of Xcc and the
resulting decline in context interference spillover mode. This effect can be suppressed with a higher p = 0.05
while cooperation level remains similar. However, as cooperation levels increase dramatically at p = 0.1,
context interference once again loses its advantage. Parameters: n = 400, m = 4, b = 1, β = 0.2, α = 0.5.
Results generated by pair approximation.
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Figure S 6. Coevolution of spillover modes for α = 0.95. Figure shows how a high α = 0.95 can change
which spillover mode takes the lead in the coevolution and mutation case. Parameter α is the probability,
during spillover, of selecting the bottom repeated local interaction layer to influence the top one-shot layer.
When repeated local interactions have a much higher influence, conditions are much more favourable for
cooperation on both network layers. The strategy profile Xcc can become more competitive when compared
to Xdc . Parameters: n = 400. α = 0.95, m = 4, b = 1, β = 0.2, mutation rate µ = 10
−3. Simulation in Fig.
S6A has at least 1.4× 109 time steps, combined over 6 runs. Fig. S6B produced using pair approximation.
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Figure S 7. Time evolution of cooperation and spillover modes for α = 0.95, c = 0.35 case.
Figure demonstrates how neighbour imitation (NIS) and self comparison (SCS) produces a higher level of
cooperation in the multiplex when they are dominant, and how context interference (CIS) results in a lower
level of cooperation when it is dominant. This lead to NIS and SCS becoming much harder to invade by CIS
as Xcc now has higher competitiveness. Parameters: n = 400, m = 4, b = 1, β = 0.2, p = 0.05, α = 0.95,
c = 0.35. Mutation rate µ = 10−3. Simulation data taken from the first 2.5× 107 time steps of a single run.
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Figure S 8. Time evolution of cooperation and spillover modes for α = 0.50, c = 0.35 case. Figure
illustrates results for a parameter combination from Fig. 5 in the main text. Here, we see that cooperation
levels are at a lower level than in Fig. S7. Thus, Xdc is much more competitive than X
c
c , leading to the
dominance of context interference spillover mode. Parameters: n = 400, m = 4, b = 1, β = 0.2, p = 0.05,
α = 0.95, c = 0.35. Mutation rate µ = 10−4. Simulation data taken from the first 1 × 108 time steps of a
single run.
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1 Datasets and Code
Datasets and code supporting this article: Figshare doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.5480548
2 Pair Approximation
We will use pair approximation to derive analytic solutions to each of the three spillover modes. Our
analytic solution for each mode consists of differential equations for q˙c, p˙c, q˙cc, p˙cc, x˙
c
c and x˙
d
c . We start with
the notation and definitions common to all three spillover modes.
2.0.1 Inter-layer Notation
Let xab be the fraction of individuals with strategies a on the top prisoner’s dilemma layer, and b on the
bottom iterated prisoner’s dilemma layer. Letting c be cooperate and d defect, we have the four cases:
xcc, x
d
c , x
c
d and x
d
d, as well as x
c
c + x
d
c + x
c
d + x
d
d = 1.
2.0.2 Top Layer Notation
Let qc and qd be the top layer fraction of C and D respectively. We must have qc + qd = 1. Let qab be
the top layer fraction of connected pairs with strategies a and b. We have four cases qcc, qcd, qdc and qdd, as
well as qcc + qcd + qdc + qdd = 1. Let the conditional probabilities be qc|c =
qcc
qc
, qd|c =
qdc
qc
, qc|d =
qcd
qd
, and
qd|d =
qdd
qd
. We must have qc|c + qd|c = 1, and qd|d + qc|d = 1.
2.0.3 Bottom Layer Notation
Let pc and pd be the bottom layer fraction of C and D respectively. We must have pc + pd = 1. Let pab be
the bottom layer fraction of connected pairs with strategies a and b. We have four cases pcc, pcd, pdc and pdd,
as well as pcc + pcd + pdc + pdd = 1. Let the conditional probabilities be pc|c =
pcc
pc
, pd|c =
pdc
pc
, pc|d =
pcd
pd
,
and pd|d =
pdd
pd
. We must have pc|c + pd|c = 1, and pd|d + pc|d = 1.
2.0.4 Top Layer Transition Probabilities Notation and Definitions
The probability of strategy b replacing strategy a is given by the Fermi equation,
F (pib, pia) =
1
1 + e−β(pib−pia)
,
where pij is the average payoff from using strategy j. Let T be the top layer and B the bottom layer. Let
the payoff matrix for layer i ∈ {T,B} be, (
Ri Si
Ti Pi
)
.
Let ki be the average degree of individuals in layer i ∈ {T,B}. Finally, let Wb→a be the probability that, if
two individuals on the top layer are chosen for strategy updating, the event “strategy b replaces a” occurs.
Then, we have
Wc→c = Wd→d =
1
2
.
For Wc→d and Wd→c, we need to consider the average payoff of a pair of connected individuals with different
strategies. So, we have
pic = (kT − 1)qc|c ·RT + (1 + (kT − 1)qd|c) · ST ,
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pid = (1 + (kT − 1)qc|d) · TT + (kT − 1)qd|d · PT ,
Wc→d = F (pic, pid),
Wd→c = F (pid, pic).
2.0.5 Bottom Layer Transition Probabilities Notation and Definitions
Let a pair of connected individuals with strategies A and B be an AB pair. Consider a CC pair in the bottom
layer, which is a two dimensional lattice with periodic boundaries. We call the individual that is selected for
strategy updating the focal individual, while the randomly chosen neighbour the non-focal individual. Let
x, y, z be the strategies of the three other neighbours of the focal individual. Let u, v, w be the strategies of
the three other neighbours of the non-focal individual.
Let n(x, y, z) be the number of strategy C among the strategies x, y, z. Then, the average payoff of the focal
individual is now
pic = (n(x, y, z) + 1) ·RB + (3− n(x, y, z)) · SB .
The average payoff of the non-focal individual is,
pi′c = (n(u, v, w) + 1) ·RB + (3− n(u, v, w)) · SB .
Let φb→a be the probability that, if the focal individual is using strategy a and the non-focal individual is
using strategy b, strategy b is sucessful at replacing strategy a. Putting it all together, the probability that
a focal C copies a neighbouring non-focal C in the bottom layer is,
φc→c =
pcxpcypczpcupcvpcw
p3cp
3
c
F (pi′c, pic),
we used the fact that px|cpy|cpz|c =
pcxpcypczpcupcvpcw
p3cp
3
c
.
For a DD pair in the bottom layer, the average payoff of the focal node and non-focal node are respectively,
pid = n(x, y, z) · TB + (1 + (3− n(x, y, z))) · PB ,
pi′d = n(u, v, w) · TB + (1 + (3− n(u, v, w))) · PB .
Then, the probability that a focal D copies a neighbouring non-focal D in the bottom layer is,
φd→d =
pdxpdypdzpdupdvpdw
p3dp
3
d
F (pi
′
d, pid).
Finally, we consider CD pairs. The average payoffs are,
pic = n(x, y, z) ·RB + (1 + (3− n(x, y, z))) · SB ,
pid = (1 + n(u, v, w)) · TB + (3− n(u, v, w)) · PB .
And then the probability that a focal C copies a neighbouring non-focal D in the bottom layer is,
φd→c =
pcxpcypczpdupdvpdw
p3cp
3
d
F (pid, pic).
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Also, for DC pairs. The average payoffs are,
pid = (1 + n(x, y, z)) · TB + (3− n(x, y, z)) · PB .
pic = n(u, v, w) ·RB + (1 + (3− n(u, v, w))) · SB ,
The probability that a focal D copies a neighbouring non-focal C in the bottom layer is,
φc→d =
pdxpdypdzpcupcvpcw
p3dp
3
c
F (pic, pid).
2.0.6 Notation for Probabilities of Specific Events and Configurations
In each of the three spillover modes, there are certain configurations of individuals and strategies that can
lead to a change in the system. Let x, y, z be strategies. Let the focal node have top strategy x and bottom
strategy z. Let the non-focal neighbour node have top strategy y and bottom strategy w. Then, we represent
the event that the top strategy x is replaced with strategy y by,
x y (top layer)
z w (bottom layer)
.
If the bottom strategies are not specified then the event includes all combinations of strategies on the bottom.
For example, the event that the top strategy x is replaced with strategy y, regardless of strategies on the
bottom, is represented by,
x y (top layer)
(bottom layer)
.
For the context interference spillover mode, if an individual with strategy x is using strategy v due to context
interference, we denote her strategy as x[v]. Let the probability of an event E be P(E). We are also using
the facts that for the top layer, xcc + x
c
d = qc, x
d
d + x
d
c = qd, and that for the bottom layer, x
c
c + x
d
c = pc,
xdd + x
c
d = pd. Finally, we let E(E) be the expected number of change in C − C links when event E occurs.
2.1 Neighbour Imitation Spillover
At each discrete time step, a random individual is chosen. With probability p, the chosen individual does
inter-layer neighbour imitation spillover updating. Otherwise, with probability 1 − p, she does intra-layer
strategy updating. During neighbour imitation spillover updating, the top layer is chosen as the focal layer
to receive spillover strategies with probability α. Otherwise, with probability 1 − α the bottom layer will
be chosen as the focal layer to receive spillover strategies from the top.
Then, the individual’s strategy on the chosen focal layer might be replaced by the strategy of a random
neighbour on the opposite non-focal layer. Payoff comparison between this neighbour and the individual is
then done, also on the opposite non-focal layer. This neighbour’s strategy has a chance of being adopted by
the individual on focal layer, given by the Fermi equation. Fig. 1B in the main text illustrates this process.
We list the probabilities of all related events and configurations below.
P
( C D
C
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· qc · qd|c ·Wd→c · x
c
c
qc
, P
( C D
D
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· qc · qd|c ·Wd→c · x
c
d
qc
.
26
P( D C
C
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· qd · qc|d ·Wc→d · x
d
c
qd
, P
( D C
D
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· qd · qc|d ·Wc→d · x
d
d
qd
.
P
( C
C D
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· pc · pd|c · φd→c · x
c
c
pc
, P
( D
C D
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· pc · pd|c · φd→c · x
d
c
pc
.
P
( C
D C
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· pd · pc|d · φc→d · x
c
d
pd
, P
( D
D C
)
= (1− p) · 1
2
· pd · pc|d · φc→d · x
d
d
pd
.
P
( DC
C
)
= p · (1− α) · qc · qd|c ·Wd→c · x
c
c
qc
, P
( CC
D
)
= p · (1− α) · qc · qc|c ·Wc→c · x
c
d
qc
.
P
( DD
C
)
= p · (1− α) · qd · qd|d ·Wd→d · x
d
c
qd
, P
( CD
D
)
= p · (1− α) · qd · qc|d ·Wc→d · x
d
d
qd
.
P
(
D
C
C
)
= p · α · pc · pd|c · φd→c · x
c
c
pc
, P
(
D
C
D
)
= p · α · pd · pd|d · φd→d · x
c
d
pd
.
P
(
C
D
D
)
= p · α · pd · pc|d · φc→d · x
d
d
pd
, P
(
C
D
C
)
= p · α · pc · pc|c · φc→c · x
d
c
pc
.
Let n(x, y, z) be the number of C strategies among the neighbours of the focal individual. Let kT be the
average degree on the top layer, and kB be the average degree on the bottom layer. The list of expected
change in number of C − C links for relevant events and configurations are as follows.
E
( C D
C
)
= −(kT − 1)qc|c, E
( C D
D
)
= −(kT − 1)qc|c.
E
( D C
C
)
= 1 + (kT − 1)qc|d, E
( D C
D
)
= 1 + (kT − 1)qc|d.
E
( C
C D
)
= −n(x, y, z), E
( D
C D
)
= −n(x, y, z),
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E( C
D C
)
= 1 + n(x, y, z), E
( D
D C
)
= 1 + n(x, y, z).
E
( DC
C
)
= −kB · pc|c, E
( CC
D
)
= kB · pc|d.
E
( DD
C
)
= −kB · pc|c, E
( CD
D
)
= kB · pc|d.
E
(
D
C
C
)
= −kT · qc|c, E
(
D
C
D
)
= −kT · qc|c.
E
(
C
D
D
)
= kT · qc|d, E
(
C
D
C
)
= kT · qc|d.
Let x, y, z be the strategies of the neighbours of the focal individual on the bottom layer. Let u, v, w be
strategies of the neighbours of the non-focal individual on the bottom layer. Then, the differential equations
for the neighbour influence spillover mode are as follows.
q˙c = P
( CD
C
)
+ P
( CD
D
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
C
D
C
)
+ P
(
C
D
D
)]
− P
( DC
C
)
− P
( DC
D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
D
C
C
)
+ P
(
D
C
D
)]
.
q˙cc =
2
kT
·
{
E
( DC
C
)
· P
( DC
C
)
+ E
( DC
D
)
· P
( DC
D
)
+ E
( CD
C
)
· P
( CD
C
)
+ E
( CD
D
)
· P
( CD
D
)
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+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
E
(
D
C
C
)
· P
(
D
C
C
)
+ E
(
D
C
D
)
· P
(
D
C
D
)
+ E
(
C
D
C
)
· P
(
C
D
C
)
+ E
(
C
D
D
)
· P
(
C
D
D
)]}
p˙c =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
( C
D C
)
+ P
( D
D C
)]
+ P
( CC
D
)
+ P
( CD
D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
( C
C D
)
+ P
( D
C D
)]
− P
( DC
C
)
− P
( DD
C
)
.
p˙cc =
2
kB
·
{ ∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
E
(
D
D
C
)
· P
(
D
D
C
)
+ E
(
D
C
C
)
· P
(
D
C
C
)
+ E
(
C
C
D
)
·P
(
C
C
D
)
+E
(
C
D
D
)
·P
(
C
D
D
)]
+E
( DC
C
)
·P
( DC
C
)
+ E
( DD
C
)
·P
( DD
C
)
+E
( CC
D
)
·P
( CC
D
)
+E
( CD
D
)
·P
( CD
D
)}
x˙cc =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
C
C
D
)
+ P
(
C
D
C
)]
+ P
( CD
C
)
+ P
( CC
D
)
− P
( DC
C
)
− P
( DC
C
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
D
C
C
)
+ P
(
D
C
C
)]
.
x˙dc =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
C
D
D
)
+ P
(
D
C
C
)]
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+ P
( DC
C
)
+ P
( CD
D
)
− P
( CD
C
)
− P
( DD
C
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
D
D
C
)
+ P
(
C
D
C
)]
.
2.2 Self Comparison Spillover
At each discrete time step, a random individual is chosen. With probability p, the chosen individual does
inter-layer self comparison spillover updating. Otherwise, with probability 1−p, she does intra-layer strategy
updating. During self comparison spillover updating, the top layer is chosen as the focal layer to receive
spillover strategies with probability α. Otherwise, with probability 1−α the bottom layer will be chosen as
the focal layer.
Then, the individual’s strategy on the chosen focal layer might be replaced by the strategy of herself on the
opposite layer. The chance that this might happen depends on payoff comparison, calculated via the Fermi
equation, with the exception that the payoff matrix for the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game in the bottom
layer is normalized by dividing each entry with the parameter m. We denote this normalized payoff matrix
by, (
RˆB SˆB
TˆB PˆB
)
.
Let kT be the average degree of individuals on the top layer. The average payoffs used by self comparison
spillover on the top layer are
pˆiTc = kT · qc|c ·RT + kT · qd|c · ST ,
pˆiTd = kT · qc|d · TT + kT · qd|d · PT .
And the average normalized payoffs on the bottom layer, used for self comparison spillover updating, are
pˆiBc = n(w, x, y, z) · RˆB + (kB − n(w, x, y, z)) · SˆB ,
pˆiBd = n(w, x, y, z) · TˆB + (kB − n(w, x, y, z)) · PˆB ,
where n(w, x, y, z) is the number of C among neighbours strategies, of the focal individual, on the bottom
layer. Then, the probabilities and expected changes in C−C links of events that changes the system through
self influence spillover update are as follows.
P
( D
C
)
= p · α · F (pˆiBc , pˆiTd ) · xdc , P
( D
C
)
= p · (1− α) · F (pˆiTd , pˆiBc ) · xdc ,
P
( C
D
)
= p · α · F (pˆiBd , pˆiTc ) · xcd, P
( C
D
)
= p · (1− α) · F (pˆiTc , pˆiBd ) · xcd,
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E( C
D
)
= −kT · qc|c, E
( D
C
)
= kT · qc|d,
E
( D
C
)
= −kB · pc|c, E
( C
D
)
= kB · pc|d,
where F is the Fermi equation previously defined. Putting it all together, and using the information from
the neighbour imitation section, we can write down the differential equations.
q˙c = P
( CD
C
)
+ P
( CD
D
)
− P
( DC
C
)
− P
( DC
D
)
+
∑
x,y,z,w
[
P
( D
C
)
− P
( C
D
)]
.
q˙cc =
2
kT
·
{
E
( DC
C
)
· P
( DC
C
)
+ E
( DC
D
)
· P
( DC
D
)
+ E
( CD
C
)
· P
( CD
C
)
+ E
( CD
D
)
· P
( CD
D
)
+
∑
x,y,z,w
[
E
( C
D
)
· P
( C
D
)
+ E
( D
C
)
· P
( D
C
)]}
.
p˙c =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
( C
D C
)
+ P
( D
D C
)
− P
( C
C D
)
− P
( D
C D
)]
+
∑
x,y,z,w
[
P
( C
D
)
− P
( D
C
)]
.
p˙cc =
2
kT
·
{ ∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
E
(
D
D
C
)
· P
(
D
D
C
)
+ E
(
D
C
C
)
· P
(
D
C
C
)
+ E
(
C
C
D
)
· P
(
C
C
D
)
+ E
(
C
D
D
)
· P
(
C
D
D
)]
+
∑
x,y,z,w
[
E
( C
D
)
· P
( C
D
)
+ E
( D
C
)
· P
( D
C
)]}
.
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x˙cc =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
C
C
D
)
− P
(
D
C
C
)]
+ P
( CD
C
)
− P
( DC
C
)
+
∑
x,y,z,w
[
P
( D
C
)
+ P
( C
D
)]
.
x˙dc =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
C
D
D
)
− P
(
D
D
C
)]
+ P
( DC
C
)
− P
( CD
C
)
−
∑
x,y,z,w
[
P
( D
C
)
+ P
( D
C
)]
.
2.3 Context Interference Spillover
At each discrete time step, a random layer and a random individual on that layer is chosen as the focal
individual for strategy updating. A random neighbour of this individual is then chosen and their payoffs
are compared via the Fermi equation. When calculating payoffs, with probability p, the focal individual
experiences context interference and uses her strategy from the bottom layer with probability α and her
strategy from the top layer with probability 1 − α. Independently, also with probability p, the chosen
neighbour can experience the same context interference. Strategy updating is then carried out with these
strategies. The differential equation for the change in fraction of C in the top layer is,
q˙c = P
( D C )
+ P
( D D[C]
C
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
C )
+ P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
−P
( C D )
− P
( C C[D]
D
)
− P
( C[D]
D
D )
− P
( C[D]
D
C[D]
D
)
.
Detailed equations for each of the terms in the sum are as follows.
P
( D C )
= P
( D
C
C
C
)
+ P
( D
C
C
D
)
+ P
( D
D
C
C
)
+ P
( D
D
C
D
)
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=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qc|d ·
(
Xdc
qd
· X
c
c
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
d
c
qd
· X
c
d
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) · (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
+
Xdd
qd
· X
c
c
qc
+
Xdd
qd
· X
c
d
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( D D[C]
C
)
= P
( D
C
D[C]
C
)
+ P
( D
D
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qd|d ·
(
Xdc
qd
· X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) · (α · p) + X
d
d
qd
· X
d
c
qc
· (α · p)
)
.
P
( D[C]
C
C )
= P
( D[C]
C
C
C
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
C
D
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qc|d · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) ·
(
Xcc
qc
+
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qd|d ·
(
Xdc
qd
· X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) · (α · p)
)
.
P
( C D )
= P
( C
C
D
C
)
+ P
( C
C
D
D
)
+ P
( C
D
D
C
)
+ P
( C
D
D
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qd|c ·
(
Xcc
qc
· X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
c
c
qc
· X
d
d
qd
+
Xcd
qc
· X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) · (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
c
d
qc
· X
d
d
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( C C[D]
D
)
= P
( C
C
C[D]
D
)
+ P
( C
D
C[D]
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qc|c · X
c
d
qc
· (α · p) ·
(
Xcc
qc
+
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
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P( C[D]
D
D )
= P
( C[D]
D
D
C
)
+ P
( C[D]
D
D
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→d · qc · qd|c · X
c
d
qc
· (α · p) ·
(
Xdc
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
d
d
qd
)
.
P
( C[D]
D
C[D]
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→d · qc · qc|c ·
(
Xcd
qc
· X
c
d
qc
· (α · p) · (α · p)
)
We write the differential equation for the change in fraction of C − C links on the top layer as a sum,
q˙cc =
2
kT
∑
E
P(E)E(E),
where the summation is over all events E that results in a change in qc, and kT is the average degree of
individual in the top network layer. All of the P(E) have been stated above. The values of E(E), the
expected change in fraction of C − C links are as follows.
E
( D C )
= (kT − 1) · qc|d + 1, E
( D D[C] )
= (kT − 1) · qc|d.
E
( D[C]
C
C )
= (kT − 1) · qc|d + 1, E
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
= (kT − 1) · qc|d.
E
( C D )
= −(kT − 1) · qc|c, E
( C C[D] )
= −(kT − 1) · qc|c − 1.
E
( C[D]
D
D )
= −(kT − 1) · qc|c, E
( C[D]
D
C[D]
D
)
= −(kT − 1) · qc|c − 1.
The differential equation for the change in fraction of C in the bottom layer is,
p˙c =
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
[
P
(
D C
)
+ P
(
D
C
D[C]
)
+ P
( C
D[C] C
)
+ P
( C
D[C]
C
D[C]
)
−P
(
C D
)
− P
(
C
D
C[D]
)
− P
( D
C[D] D
)
− P
( D
C[D]
D
C[D]
)]
,
where the summation is over all possible strategies of the neighbours x, y, z of the focal individual, and over
all possible strategies u, v, w of the neighbours of the non-focal individual. Detailed equations for each of
the terms in the sum are as follows.
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P(
D C
)
= P
( C
D
C
C
)
+ P
( C
D
D
C
)
+ P
( D
D
C
C
)
+ P
( D
D
D
C
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pc|d ·
(
Xcd
pd
· X
c
c
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
c
d
pd
· X
d
c
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) · (1− p+ α · p)
+
Xdd
pd
· X
c
c
pc
+
Xdd
pd
· X
d
c
pc
· (1− p+ α · p)
)
.
P
(
D
C
D[C]
)
= P
( C
D
C
D[C]
)
+ P
( D
D
C
D[C]
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pd|d · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xcd
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
d
pd
)
.
P
( C
D[C] C
)
= P
( C
D[C]
D
C
)
+ P
( C
D[C]
C
C
)
=
1
2
· φc→c · pd · pc|d · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xdc
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
c
c
pc
)
.
P
( C
D[C]
C
D[C]
)
=
1
2
· φc→c · pd · pd|d ·
(
Xcd
pd
· X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p) · ((1− α) · p)
)
.
P
(
C D
)
= P
( C
C
C
D
)
+ P
( C
C
D
D
)
+ P
( D
C
C
D
)
+ P
( D
C
D
D
)
=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pd|c ·
(
Xcc
pc
· X
c
d
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
c
c
pc
· X
d
d
pd
+
Xdc
pc
· X
c
d
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) · (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
c
pc
· X
d
d
pd
· (1− p+ α · p)
)
.
P
(
C
D
C[D]
)
= P
( D
C
D
C[D]
)
+ P
( C
C
D
C[D]
)
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=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pc|c · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xdc
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
c
c
pc
)
.
P
( D
C[D] D
)
= P
( D
C[D]
C
D
)
+ P
( D
C[D]
D
D
)
=
1
2
· φd→d · pc · pd|c · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xcd
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
d
pd
)
.
P
( D
C[D]
D
C[D]
)
=
1
2
· φd→d · pc · pc|c ·
(
Xdc
pc
· X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p) · ((1− α) · p)
)
.
We write the differential equation for the change in fraction of C − C links on the bottom layer as a sum,
p˙cc =
2
kB
∑
E
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P(E)E(E),
where the summation is over all possible strategies of the neighbours x, y, z of the focal individual, over all
possible strategies u, v, w of the neighbours of the non-focal individual, and all events E that results in a
change in pc. kB is the average degree of the bottom layer. All of the P(E) have been defined above. Let
n(x, y, z) be the number of C among neighbour strategies x, y, z. Then E(E), the expected change in fraction
of C − C links for each event E are as follows.
E
(
D C
)
= n(x, y, z) + 1, E
(
D D[C]
)
= n(x, y, z).
E
( C
D[C] C
)
= n(x, y, z) + 1, E
( C
D[C]
C
D[C]
)
= n(x, y, z).
E
(
C D
)
= −n(x, y, z), E
(
C C[D]
)
= −n(x, y, z)− 1.
E
( D
C[D] D
)
= −n(x, y, z), E
( D
C[D]
D
C[D]
)
= −n(x, y, z)− 1.
The differential equation for the change in fraction of individuals with strategy C on the top layer and C in
the bottom layer is,
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X˙cc = −P
( C
C
D )
− P
( C
C
C[D]
D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
C D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
C
D
C[D]
)
+P
( D
C
C )
+ P
( D
C
D[C]
C
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
C )
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
D C
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
D
C
D[C]
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
D[C]
C
D[C]
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( C
D[C] C
)
.
Details for each term in the sum are as follows.
P
( C
C
D )
= P
( C
C
D
D
)
+ P
( C
C
D
C
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qd|c · X
c
c
qc
·
(
Xdd
qd
+
Xdc
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( C
C
C[D]
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qc|c · X
c
c
qc
· X
c
d
qc
· (α · p).
P
( C
C D
)
= P
( C
C
C
D
)
+ P
( C
C
D
D
)
=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pd|c · X
c
c
pc
·
(
Xcd
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
d
pd
)
.
P
( C
C
D
C[D]
)
=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pc|c · X
c
c
pc
· X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p).
P
( D
C
C )
= P
( D
C
C
D
)
+ P
( D
C
C
C
)
37
=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qc|d · X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) ·
(
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
c
c
qc
)
.
P
( D
C
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qd|d · X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p).
P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qd|d · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p).
P
( D[C]
C
C )
= P
( D[C]
C
C
D
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
C
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qc|d · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) ·
(
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
c
c
qc
)
.
P
( C
D C
)
= P
( C
D
C
C
)
+ P
( C
D
D
C
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pc|d · X
c
d
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) ·
(
Xcc
pc
+
Xdc
pc
· (1− p+ α · p)
)
.
P
( C
D
C
D[C]
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pd|d · X
c
d
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p).
P
( C
D[C]
C
D[C]
)
=
1
2
· φc→c · pd · pd|d · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p) · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p).
P
( C
D[C] C
)
= P
( C
D[C]
D
C
)
+ P
( C
D[C]
C
C
)
38
=
1
2
· φc→c · pd · pc|d · X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xdc
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
c
c
pc
)
.
The differential equation for the change in fraction of individuals with strategy D on the top layer and C in
the bottom layer is,
X˙dc = −P
( D
C
C )
− P
( D
C
D[C]
C
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
C D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
C
D
C[D]
)
−P
( D[C]
C
C )
− P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
C[D] D
)
−
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
C[D]
D
C[D]
)
+P
( C
C
D )
+ P
( C
C
C[D]
D
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
D C
)
+
∑
x,y,z,u,v,w
P
( D
D
C
D[C]
)
.
Details for each term in the sum are as follows.
P
( D
C
C )
= P
( D
C
C
C
)
+ P
( D
C
C
D
)
=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qc|d · X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) ·
(
Xcc
qc
+
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( D
C
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→d · qd · qd|d · X
d
c
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p).
P
( D[C]
C
C )
= P
( D[C]
C
C
C
)
+ P
( D[C]
C
C
D
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qc|d · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) ·
(
Xcc
qc
+
Xcd
qc
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p)
)
.
P
( D[C]
C
D[C]
C
)
=
1
2
·Wc→c · qd · qd|d · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p) · X
d
c
qd
· (α · p).
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P( D
C D
)
= P
( D
C
C
D
)
+ P
( D
C
D
D
)
=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pd|c · X
d
c
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) ·
(
Xcd
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
d
pd
)
.
P
( D
C
D
C[D]
)
=
1
2
· φd→c · pc · pc|c · X
d
c
pc
· (1− p+ α · p) · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p).
P
( D
C[D] D
)
= P
( D
C[D]
C
D
)
+ P
( D
C[D]
D
D
)
=
1
2
· φd→d · pc · pd|c · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p) ·
(
Xcd
pd
· (1− p+ α · p) + X
d
d
pd
)
.
P
( D
C[D]
D
C[D]
)
=
1
2
· φd→d · pc · pc|c · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p) · X
d
c
pc
· ((1− α) · p).
P
( C
C
D )
= P
( C
C
D
C
)
+ P
( C
C
D
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qd|c · X
c
c
qc
·
(
Xdc
qd
· (1− p+ (1− α) · p) + X
d
d
qd
)
.
P
( C
C
C[D]
D
)
=
1
2
·Wd→c · qc · qc|c · X
c
c
qc
· X
c
d
qc
· (α · p).
P
( D
D C
)
= P
( D
D
C
C
)
+ P
( D
D
D
C
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pc|d · X
d
d
pd
·
(
Xcc
pc
+
Xdc
pc
· (1− p+ α · p)
)
.
40
P( D
D
C
D[C]
)
=
1
2
· φc→d · pd · pd|d · X
d
d
pd
· X
c
d
pd
· ((1− α) · p).
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